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Recent Developments 
The Rush to a First-to-File Patent System in the 
United States: Is a Globally Standardized Patent 
Reward System Really Beneficial to Patent Quality 
and Administrative Efficiency? 
Brad Pedersen* & Vadim Braginsky** 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Patent reform in the United States was the focus of a 
major legislative push in 2005 with the introduction of the 
Patent Reform Act of 2005 in the House of Representatives.1  
The bill was introduced by Representative Lamar Smith, 
Chairman of the Subcommittee on Courts, the Internet and 
Intellectual Property, and was cosponsored by five other House 
members.2  Representative Howard Berman, one of the 
cosponsors and former chair of the subcommittee, commented 
that the motivations behind the reform bill were to alleviate 
concerns about patent quality and patent litigation abuse and 
to take steps toward global patent harmonization.3  Ultimately, 
work on the bill was sidelined in the fall due in part to 
apparent disagreements among the various industry groups 
backing the legislation.4  Still, the patent reform movement 
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 1. Patent Reform Act of 2005, H.R. 2795, 109th Cong. (2005). 
 2. See 151 CONG. REC. E1160 (daily ed. June 8, 2005) (statement of Rep. 
Berman). 
 3. See id. 
 4. See J. Matthew Buchanan, House Subcommittee Hearing on Patent 
Reform – Compromise and Controversy, Sept. 15, 2005, 
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continues to carry substantial momentum, as exemplified by 
the recent proposed changes to U.S. Patent and Trademark 
Office (USPTO) rules,5 and the introduction this year of a 
Senate bill advocating changes to the patent system6 and 
another version of a patent reform bill in the House.7  In this 
climate, we are virtually assured of continuing reform efforts. 
The changes introduced in 2005 are comprehensive in 
nature and would have a significant impact on how businesses, 
both large and small, use U.S. patent laws.  One of the most 
significant proposed changes in the Patent Reform Act was a 
switch from the current “first-to-invent” standard to a “first-to-
file” standard in determining who should be awarded a patent.8  
Another bill, as part of recently introduced legislation in the 
Senate, also advocates adoption of a first-to-file standard.9  The 
first-to-file system is presently the standard being used in both 
Japan and Europe, and proponents view the switch to a first-to-
file standard as an important step in harmonizing our patent 
laws with the standards used in Europe and Japan.10 
Regardless of which standard is viewed as better in the 
long-term, it is clear that changing the current patent system 
from a first-to-invent standard to a first-to-file standard will 
almost certainly decrease the quality of patents and increase 
                                                          
http://promotetheprogress.com/archives/2005/09/house_subcommit_5.html. 
 5. See Changes to Practice for Continuing Applications, Requests for 
Continued Examination Practice, and Applications Containing Patentably 
Indistinct Claims, 71 Fed. Reg. 48 (proposed Jan. 3, 2006) (to be codified at 37 
CFR pt. 1); Changes to Practice for the Examination of Claims in Patent 
Applications, 71 Fed. Reg. 61 (proposed Jan. 3, 2006) (to be codified at 37 CFR 
pt. 1). 
 6. See Protecting America’s Competitive Edge Through Education and 
Research Act of 2006, S. 2198, 109th Cong. § 321 (2006). 
 7. See Patents Depend on Quality Act of 2006, H.R. 5096, 109th Cong. 
(2006).  The Act, introduced April 5, 2006, contains a shortened set of the 
changes proposed by the 2005 Patent Reform Act. The Act does not include a 
change to the first-to-file standard; however, the House Subcommittee has 
scheduled hearings on this issue. 
 8. See Patent Reform Act of 2005, H.R. 2795, 109th Cong. § 3 (2005).  
Note, however, that the Patent Act of 2005 actually adopted a modified first-
to-file rule, in which a vestigial first-to-invent rule remained for those 
situations in which the claimed invention was patented or described in a 
printed publication or otherwise publicly known one year or less before the 
effective filing date of the claimed invention. 
 9. See S. 2198 § 321(3)(A). 
 10. See 151 CONG. REC. E1160 (daily ed. June 8, 2005) (statement of Rep. 
Berman). 
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the costs of patent litigation in the United States.  Any time 
there is a fundamental upheaval in the basic rules governing a 
legal system, there is a transition cost incurred to change from 
the status quo to the new system.  Companies, inventors, 
patent attorneys, and the USPTO will all need to learn the new 
rules and new regulations will need to be created to fill the 
gaps in these new laws.  The costs of patent litigation in the 
short term will certainly increase as the uncertainty associated 
with how the new laws will be interpreted and applied by the 
courts works its way through the legal system and new case 
law is generated.  These short-term transition costs might be 
acceptable if they are ultimately outweighed by the long-term 
benefits of making such a fundamental change.  Unfortunately, 
attempting to achieve global patent harmonization by adopting 
a first-to-file standard in the United States will not achieve the 
desired long-term goals of improving patent quality, improving 
administrative efficiency at the USPTO, and providing a better 
system for rewarding innovation. 
II. FIRST-TO-INVENT AND FIRST-TO-FILE STANDARDS 
“First-to-invent” and “first-to-file” represent two different 
standards for determining which inventor is entitled to the 
grant of a patent.11  In the United States, first-to-invent is the 
established regime.12  The inventor who is first to complete the 
act of invention will have superior rights to later inventors so 
long as the first inventor did not abandon, suppress, or conceal 
the invention.13  In the first-to-invent system, the act of filing 
                                                          
 11. See generally 2 R. CARL MOY, MOY’S WALKER ON PATENTS §§ 8:35-8:36 
(4th ed. 2003). 
 12. See 35 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2000) (“A person shall be entitled to a patent 
unless the invention was known or used by others in this country, or patented 
or described in a printed publication in this or a foreign country, before the 
invention thereof by the applicant for patent.” (emphasis added)); 35 U.S.C. § 
102(g)(2) (“A person shall be entitled to a patent unless . . . before such 
person’s invention thereof, the invention was made in this country by another 
inventor who had not abandoned, suppressed, or concealed it.” (emphasis 
added)). 
 13. See 35 U.S.C. § 102(g)(2).  “Inventions are essentially specialized 
forms or knowledge; stated in basic theoretical terms, an invention is simply 
knowledge of how technology may be applied to achieve a particular beneficial 
result.”  1 MOY, supra note 11, § 1:27.  “Courts have repeatedly asserted that 
the person who conceives of the invention is the inventor regardless of who 
else contributes to the invention finally being completed. . . . [U]nder the usual 
view inventorship does not attach from the act of accomplishing a reduction to 
practice.”  3 MOY, supra note 11, § 10:11. 
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the patent application is not controlling, although in practice, it 
usually approximates the relative dates of invention.14 
Because the act of filing is not solely determinative of the 
right to obtain a patent, factual issues as to the making of the 
invention must be resolved in the event there is a potential 
question of priority of invention.15  In cases in which two or 
more applicants submit patent applications close in time and 
claim the same or substantially similar subject matter, 
resolution of which inventor was actually the first to invent is 
handled in an administrative proceeding called an 
interference.16  In patent litigation, first-to-invent issues can 
arise as one of the challenges to patent validity.17  In both 
forums, the inquiry as to the dates of invention involves 
examining corroborating evidence.18 
The first-to-file system, by contrast, rewards the act of 
filing for patent protection by granting superior rights to the 
inventor who first files a sufficient patent application.19  One of 
the main arguments advanced in favor of the first-to-file regime 
lies in the administrative efficiency of not having to resolve 
factual disputes related to dates of invention.20  In theory, the 
                                                          
 14. See 2 MOY, supra note 11, § 8:36. 
 15. See generally id. § 8:34. 
 16. See 35 U.S.C. § 135 (2000); 37 C.F.R. §§ 1.601-1.690 (2005); see also 2 
MOY, supra note 11, § 8:34.  An interference is a proceeding directed at 
determining the first to invent as among the parties to the proceeding, 
involving two or more pending applications naming different inventors or one 
or more pending applications and one or more unexpired patents naming 
different inventors.  See 37 C.F.R. § 1.601(i).  The first of many to reduce an 
invention to practice around the same time will be the sole party to obtain a 
patent, unless another was the first to conceive and later coupled his 
conception to his reduction to practice with reasonable diligence.  See Radio 
Corp. of Am. v. Radio Eng’g Labs., Inc., 293 U.S. 1, 2 (1934); Hull v. 
Davenport, 90 F.2d 103, 105 (C.C.P.A. 1937). 
 17. In such situations, an alleged infringer offers evidence to show prior 
invention by someone other than the patentee.  See 2 MOY, supra note 11, § 
8:34. 
 18. See Kridl v. McCormick, 105 F.3d 1446, 1449-50 (Fed. Cir. 1997) 
(stating that “[c]onception must be proved by corroborating evidence which 
shows that the inventor disclosed to others his ‘complete thought expressed in 
such clear terms as to enable those skilled in the art to make the invention’” 
(citation omitted)); see also 37 C.F.R. § 1.608(b) (explaining that the evidence 
includes “affidavits by the applicant, if possible, and one or more corroborating  
witnesses, supported by documentary evidence, if  available”). 
 19. See 2 MOY, supra note 11, § 8:36. 
 20. See id. 
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issue of which of two or more competing inventors should be 
entitled to a patent for an otherwise patentable invention is 
determined simply by looking to which inventor first filed a 
patent application for the invention.21  Although the first-to-file 
standard appears to elevate the value of filing patent 
applications over the actual inventive process, first-to-file 
patent systems typically include legal doctrines, such as prior 
user rights, suggesting that such systems do not necessarily 
value filing over inventing.22  The first-to-file standard in other 
countries typically awards compulsory licenses to persons, 
other than the patentee, who were sufficiently active prior to 
the date on which the application for patent was filed.23  The 
“net effect” is to authorize the recognition of certain rights, 
albeit inferior to the patentee’s rights, in persons who were not 
first to file.24 
Because the first-to-invent and first-to-file standards use 
such different sets of operative facts, the respective patent 
systems in which these standards are implemented tend to 
drive correspondingly different behaviors in those seeking to 
use the patent systems.  For example, an inventor operating 
under the first-to-invent rules will tend to gather corroborating 
evidence of the key dates and perform due diligence to support 
the dates of conception and reduction to practice of an 
invention.25  Under the first-to-file rules, however, inventors 
will simply rush to prepare and file a patent application as soon 
as practicable after conceiving of an invention, so as to preserve 
their rights to obtain patent protection.26 
III. DIFFERENT WAYS TO REWARD INNOVATION 
Every country’s patent laws are the unique product of that 
country’s socioeconomic and business environments, and they 
are designed to reward innovation as part of the overall 
economic, legal, and social matrix for the country.  The first-to-
                                                          
 21. See id. 
 22. See id. 
 23. See id. n.11. 
 24. See id. 
 25. See, e.g., Shu-Hui Chen v. Bouchard, 347 F.3d 1299, 1308-12 (Fed. Cir. 
2003). 
 26. Cf. Charles L. Gholz, First-to-File or First-to-Invent?, 82 J. PAT. & 
TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 891, 895 (2000) (claiming that under a first-to-file 
system “the average time between Eureka! and filing will go down in the 
United States”). 
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invent and first-to-file standards represent two such methods 
for rewarding innovation.  Over the last twenty years, a large 
volume of literature has been generated arguing the pros and 
cons of the two patent systems.27  The debate between these 
                                                          
 27. See, e.g., Mark T. Banner & John J. McDonnell, First-to-File, 
Mandatory Reexamination, and Mandatory “Exceptional Circumstance”: Ideas 
for Better? Or Worse?, 69 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 595 (1987); Coe A. 
Bloomberg, In Defense of the First-to-Invent Rule, 21 AIPLA Q.J. 255 (1993); 
Sean T. Carnathan, Patent Priority Disputes – A Proposed Re-Definition of 
“First-to-Invent”, 49 ALA. L. REV. 755 (1998); Ned L. Conley, First-to-Invent: A 
Superior System for the United States, 22 ST. MARY’S L.J. 779 (1991); Donald 
R. Dunner, First to File: Should Our Interference System Be Abolished?, 68 J. 
PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 561 (1986); William T. Fryer, III, Patent Law 
Harmonization Treaty Decision Is Not Far Off – What Course Should the U.S. 
Take?: A Review of the Current Situation and Alternatives Available, 30 IDEA 
309 (1989-90); Gholz, supra note 26; Gabriel P. Katona, First-to-File – Not in 
the United States, 73 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 399 (1991); Charles 
R.B. Macedo, First-to-File: Is American Adoption of the International Standard 
in Patent Law Worth the Price?, 18 AIPLA Q.J. 193 (1990); Gerald J. 
Mossinghoff, The U.S. First-to-Invent System Has Provided No Advantage to 
Small Entities, 84 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 425 (2002); Bernarr R. 
Pravel, Why the United States Should Adopt the First-to-File System for 
Patents, 22 ST. MARY’S L.J. 797 (1991); Toshiko Takenaka, Rethinking the 
United States First-to-Invent Principle from a Comparative Law Perspective: A 
Proposal to Restructure § 102 Novelty and Priority Provisions, 39 HOUS. L. 
REV. 621 (2002); Andrew H. Thorson & John A. Fortkort, Japan’s Patent 
System: An Analysis of Patent Protection Under Japan’s First-to-File System, 
77 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 291 (1995); Edward C. Walterscheid, 
Priority of Invention: How the United States Came to Have a “First-to-Invent” 
Patent System, 23 AIPLA Q.J. 263 (1995); Blake R. Wiggs, Canada’s First-to-
File Experience – Should the U.S. Make the Move?, 73 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK 
OFF. SOC’Y 493 (1991); Gregory J. Wrenn, What Should Be Our Priority – 
Protection for the First to File or the First to Invent?, 72 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK 
OFF. SOC’Y 872 (1990); Karen M. Curesky, Note, International Patent 
Harmonization Through W.I.P.O.: An Analysis of the U.S. Proposal to Adopt a 
“First-To-File” Patent System, 21 LAW & POL’Y INT’L BUS. 289 (1989); Vito J. 
DeBari, Note, International Harmonization of Patent Law: A Proposed 
Solution to the United States’ First-to-File Debate, 16 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 687 
(1992-93); Stephanie Gore, Comment, “Eureka!  But I Filed Too Late . . .”: The 
Harm/Benefit Dichotomy of a First-to-File Patent System, 1993 U. CHI. L. SCH. 
ROUNDTABLE 293 (1993); Peter A. Jackman, Essay, Adoption of a First-to-File 
Patent System: A Proposal, 26 U. BALT. L. REV. 67 (1997); Kim Taylor, Note, 
Patent Harmonization Treaty Negotiations on Hold: The “First to File” Debate 
Continues, 20 J. CONTEMP. L. 521 (1994); Linda R. Cohen & Jun Ishii, 
Competition, Innovation and Racing for Priority at the U.S. Patent and 
Trademark Office (AEI-Brookings Joint Center for Regulatory Studies, 
Working Paper 05-22, 2005), available at http://www.aei-
brookings.org/admin/authorpdfs/page.php?id=1215; Dave Simon, The First-to-
File Provisions of the Patent Reform Act of 2005 Violate the Constitution’s 
Intellectual Property Clause (Nov. 2005), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=841404. 
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standards is often understood as a debate over whether there is 
more benefit to a society in encouraging and rewarding early 
disclosure of inventions versus encouraging and rewarding 
early invention.  The practical effects of these different 
standards impact various aspects of the innovation reward 
system of a given country. 
The U.S. patent system, with its first-to-invent standard 
and lower costs, can be considered primarily a distributed 
innovation reward system.  An underlying goal of a purely 
distributed innovation system is to encourage as much 
innovation as possible by as many different players on the 
economic stage, allowing the unseen hand of free enterprise to 
determine which innovations prevail.  From the standpoint of 
encouraging and enabling the capitalization of inventive 
activity, a distributed innovation system rewards innovation by 
granting technologically broad and exclusive rights and 
providing strong remedies for enforcement of those rights.28  
This combination enables and encourages participation at the 
grassroots level by players who do not necessarily have any 
significant market presence or financial resources.29  A 
distributed innovation system is designed to reward a variety of 
players—universities to private enterprises, individual 
inventors to multinational conglomerates—whether or not they 
presently possess commercially viable technology. 
In contrast, the European Union patent system with its 
first-to-file standard and higher costs30 primarily exhibits 
characteristics of a centralized innovation reward system.  An 
underlying goal of a purely centralized innovation system is to 
lower the adoption costs for new innovation by facilitating and 
encouraging the existing players to improve and expand their 
technologies in a way that encourages disclosure and cross-
licensing of new and improved technologies with other 
commercial players.31  This system tends to reward technology 
                                                          
 28. See generally ADAM B. JAFFE & JOSH LERNER, INNOVATION AND ITS 
DISCONTENTS: HOW OUR BROKEN PATENT SYSTEM IS ENDANGERING 
INNOVATION AND PROGRESS, AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT 25-55 (2004). 
 29. See Conley, supra note 27, at 785-86. 
 30. See Margaret A. Boulware et al., An Overview of Intellectual Property 
Rights Abroad, 16 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 441, 474-75 (1994); Samson Helfgott, Why 
Must Filing in Europe Be So Costly, 76 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 787 
(1994). 
 31. See Macedo, supra note 27, at 224 n.167; see also Richard T. Jackson,  
A Lockean Approach to the Compulsory Patent Licensing Controversy, 9 J. 
TECH. L. & POL'Y 117 (2004); Joseph A. Yosick, Note, Compulsory Patent 
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development by existing players already possessing 
commercially viable technologies. 
IV. MOTIVATION BEHIND AND SUPPORT FOR A FIRST-
TO-FILE STANDARD 
The primary arguments advanced in support of choosing a 
first-to-file standard over a first-to-invent standard focus on the 
increased administrative efficiency and certainty of deciding 
who should be awarded a patent.32  The advantages of 
efficiency and certainty are touted both in terms of measuring 
the validity of the patent relative to the state of the prior art 
and in terms of deciding which applicant should be awarded 
the patent in the situation where there are overlapping 
inventions.33  The theory behind these arguments is that 
increased administrative efficiency and certainty in granting 
patents will lead to improved patent quality and, consequently, 
decreased patent litigation costs for defending against patents 
that are either invalid or indiscernible.34 
A move to a first-to-file standard is also urged as a step 
toward the desired goal of global harmonization of patent 
laws.35  However, while the concept of global harmonization of 
patent standards might be understood as an abstract goal of 
governmental officials, there is more than meets the eye as to 
why there is such a strong push for bringing U.S. standards in 
line with the standards of Europe and Japan.  There is a long 
range plan of pressing for an international treaty that would 
create a mutual reciprocity for patents granted in any of the big 
three patent systems (United States, Europe, and Japan).36 
                                                          
Licensing for Efficient Use of Inventions, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 1275, 1276 
(citing examples of compulsory licensing in Japan, Germany, and the United 
Kingdom). 
 32. See 2 MOY, supra note 11, § 8:36. 
 33. See Tatenaka, supra note 27. 
 34. See id. at 654-65. 
 35. See Pravel, supra note 27, at 800-01; see also DeBari, supra note 27; 
Taylor, supra note 27. 
 36. See Michael D. Kaminski, Patent Harmonization: International Efforts 
Are Gradually Unifying the World’s Patent Laws, MODERN DRUG DISCOVERY, 
Jan. 2001, at 36, available at 
http://pubs.acs.org/subscribe/journals/mdd/v04/i01/html/patents.html; see also 
U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, Action Paper on the Pursuit of Substantive 
Patent Law Harmonization, 
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/strat21/action/gd1i01.htm  (last modified 
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This plan calls for not only reciprocal treatment of patents, but 
also encourages other countries to accept patents granted by 
any of these three patent systems for enforcement in those 
other countries.37  The long-term effect of this harmonization 
will be to bring the world one step closer to global laws and 
standards governing intellectual property rights. 
Clearly a system in which patents granted by any of the 
big three patent offices are respected worldwide will be more 
beneficial to large, multinational corporations, for which 
expenses and uncertainty associated with patent rights are of 
more concern.  In general, larger corporations and business 
groups are in support of harmonizing patent laws by adopting a 
first-to-file patent system.38  For the individual inventor and 
small business that may be less likely to commercialize an 
invention outside of the United States, however, the value of 
such potential global patent protection is probably less 
important, and, consequently, smaller inventors and 
universities will tend to contest the proposed legislation.39 
While various interest groups have taken sides in the 
debate surrounding the proposed legislation,40 the ultimate 
impact of a change to a first-to-file standard on individual and 
small businesses versus large corporations is uncertain.  On 
one hand, such a change will place individual inventors and 
small businesses at a disadvantage because they have fewer 
resources and less knowledge about the system to compete 
effectively in a first-to-file regime.41  On the other hand, just as 
                                                          
Nov. 23, 2003) (stating the goal of promoting harmonization and making it 
easier for American intellectual property holders to obtain international 
protection); U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, Statement of Intent on Patent 
Law Harmonization, Feb. 5, 2005,  
http://www.uspto.gov/main/homepagenews/bak08feb2005.htm (stating desire 
“to consider: (i) substantive patent law harmonization issues, notably the 
Trilateral ‘first package,’ as developed by the United States Patent and 
Trademark Office, the European Patent Office and the Japan Patent Office”). 
 37. See Kaminski, supra note 36. 
 38. See Donald W. Banner, Patent Law Harmonization, 1 U. BALT. 
INTELL. PROP. L.J. 9, 14-15 (1992). 
 39. See Letter from Ronald J. Riley, President, Professional Inventors 
Alliance USA, to Editor of the Washington Post (July 8, 2005), available at 
http://www.piausa.org/patent_reform/letters/ron_riley_07_08_2005; see also 
Eric Chabrow, Fairness V. Efficiency, INFORMATION WEEK, Feb. 21, 2006, 
available at  
http://www.informationweek.com/showArticle.jhtml?articleID=180205517. 
 40. See Taylor, supra note 27, at 522 n.7. 
 41. See Conley, supra 27, at 785-87; James E. White, The U.S. First-to-
Invent System, the Mossinghoff Conclusion, . . . and Statistics, 85 J. PAT. & 
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in the rest of the business world, individual inventors and 
small businesses are more nimble and may benefit from the 
advantage of less bureaucracy in deciding more quickly than 
large organizations whether to file patent applications and on 
which patent applications to focus their resources.42 
V. ARGUMENTS AGAINST THE FIRST-TO-FILE 
STANDARD FOR THE UNITED STATES 
A. FIRST-TO-INVENT ENCOURAGES GREATER PATENT QUALITY 
Contrary to the arguments advanced for adopting a first-
to-file standard in the United States as a way to improve 
patent quality, there are more compelling arguments for why a 
first-to-file standard in the United States would actually 
decrease patent quality in the long term. 
With respect to quality as measured by the validity and the 
clarity of the claims that define an invention in a patent 
application, it is easy to understand how permitting a longer 
period of time to pass from the date of an invention to the date 
of filing a corresponding patent application under a first-to-
invent system will enable a greater opportunity for applicants 
to submit more complete disclosures and better claims.  
Whether patent applicants take advantage of the opportunity 
afforded by this greater period of time in which to prepare a 
better patent application is a question that more often turns on 
the economics of the costs of preparing a patent application as 
much as on the amount of time available for such preparation.  
Similarly, additional time to draft the claims in a patent 
application facilitates the ability to gather information from 
prior art or the marketplace to better understand the scope to 
which the inventor is entitled, thereby avoiding the need to use 
a shotgun approach to drafting claims.43  Additional time to file 
                                                          
TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 357, 362-64 (2003).  While the overall costs of utilizing 
a harmonized innovation reward system may be less on a global level, 
adopting a first-to-file regime in the United States is likely to drive up the 
costs of early-stage technology development by forcing more money and 
resources to be expended earlier in the development process to prepare and 
file patent applications before actually reducing the inventions to practice and 
determining their usefulness or commercial viability. 
 42. See, e.g., Steve Seidenberg, A Sea Change in Patent Law, ABA J., Jan. 
2006, at 51-52. 
 43. Without such information, patent attorneys are more likely to draft 
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the patent application also permits applicants to assess the 
economic value of their invention before proceeding with 
pursuit of patent protection and incurring the associated filing 
and legal fees.  Applicants are therefore afforded an 
opportunity to self-screen their inventions for usefulness. 
In contrast, the objective of a first-to-file patent system is, 
in effect, to reward early filing and punish late filing.  
Therefore, there is an inherent disincentive to prepare a careful 
and thoughtful patent application in which the prior art is well-
searched and the claims of the invention are initially drafted to 
overcome the prior art.  Instead, the first-to-file system rewards 
quick and short filings that disclose, for example, the details of 
one aspect of an invention, but undertake no evaluation of 
which features or benefits of the invention distinguish it over 
the prior art.44  As a result, the disclosures tend to exhibit less 
quality in terms of the teaching of the invention and the 
validity and clarity of the claims.  The claims are more likely to 
be overly broad so as to read on prior art, or fail to provide 
adequate notice to the public of their scope.  In this way, a first-
to-file patent system inherently results in more patent 
applications having lower quality on average than a first-to-
invent patent system.45  Likewise, the first-to-file regime takes 
away the abovementioned self-screening opportunity.  
Applicants in a first-to-file system who discover after filing that 
their patent protection may not be worth pursuing will have 
already incurred substantial costs, and may decide to continue 
to prosecute the application in hopes that it might somehow 
slip through an already overburdened patent office. 
The European and Japanese patent offices are often held 
up as having higher quality patent examinations than the U.S. 
patent office; however, the reasons for this apparent higher 
quality in terms of patent validity are largely unrelated to the 
first-to-file patent system.  The European and Japanese patent 
systems do not have the same kinds of problems with patent 
validity as the U.S. patent office in large part because of the 
                                                          
overly broad claims in order to avoid surrendering patentable subject matter, 
as subject matter disclosed but not claimed is dedicated to the public.  See  
Johnson & Johnston Assocs., Inc. v. R.E. Serv. Co., Inc., 285 F.3d 1046, 1054 
(Fed. Cir. 2002). 
 44. See Conley, supra note 27, at 788. 
 45. See Donald S. Chisum, Introduction, The Harmonization of 
International Patent Law, 26 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 437, 448 (1993); Taylor, 
supra note 27, at 535. 
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significant delay in prosecuting patent applications in both 
systems—on average three to five years for the European 
Patent Office46 and five to six years for the Japanese Patent 
Office,47 where a request for examination does not even have to 
be made until three years after the priority date of a patent 
application.48  These delays, coupled with the annuity fees that 
must be paid each year an application is pending and, in the 
case of the European Patent Office, significantly higher filing 
fees,49 serve as a self-screening process in which many patent 
applications are either never filed or never examined because of 
the expense of the process.50  The delays can further function to 
improve the quality of patent examinations by providing time 
for the settling out of prior art.  In technology sectors where 
multiple players are actively publishing, marketing, or 
otherwise disclosing their technology, prior art sources can 
become available during the additional time between the 
patent filing date and examination. 
Patent “quality” is a broad, multi-faceted concept most 
often discussed in the abstract without any specific context that 
would permit quantifiable measurement.  Some of the different 
aspects of patent quality that are entangled under the general 
rubric of concerns about patent “quality” can be separated into: 
(1) the validity of the issued claims (the “validity facet”), (2) the 
discernability of the claim scope (the “notice facet”), (3) the 
effectiveness of the patent at teaching the invention to society 
                                                          
 46. See EUROPEAN PATENT OFFICE, HOW TO GET A EUROPEAN PATENT: 
GUIDE FOR APPLICANTS PART ONE 9 (10th ed. 2004), available at 
http://www.european-patent-office.org/legal/guiapp1/pdf/g1en_net.pdf. 
 47. See European Patent Office, Patent Information: Frequently Asked 
Questions About Japan, http://patentinfo.european-patent-
office.org/prod_serv/far_east/faq/japan/index.en.php#4 (last visited Mar. 23, 
2006). 
 48. See id. 
 49. See Boulware et al., supra note 30; Helfgott, supra note 30. 
 50. See generally John Doll, Commissioner for Patents, Presentation at 
the USPTO Town Hall Meeting (Feb. 1, 2006), available at 
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/dapp/opla/presentation/focuspp.html 
(stating that in response to USPTO rule changes that would drive up the costs 
of prosecuting a patent application, patent applicants are expected to more 
rigorously self-screen prior to filing for patent).  Self-screening of this type is 
perhaps the most effective way of culling out the large number of high 
visibility “vanity” patents (for example, the side-to-side swinging patent, U.S. 
Patent No. 6,368,227 (filed Nov. 17, 2000)) that are typically presented as the 
poster-children for those attacking the quality of patents granted by the 
USPTO. 
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(the “teaching facet”), and (4) the value, or usefulness, of the 
patented invention itself (the “value facet”).  Only by 
identifying a given facet can there be any meaningful 
discussion of a quantifiable measurement of that aspect of 
patent quality.51  Regardless of which facet of patent quality is 
considered, there is little evidence to support the theory that a 
first-to-file system would improve patent quality. 
B. FIRST-TO-FILE AND ADMINISTRATIVE EFFICIENCY 
The patent laws of the European Union and Japan 
implement an absolute novelty rule under which no grace 
period is provided to applicants.52  As such, the inventor’s own 
public activities prior to filing can prevent patentability.  This 
test, combined with the first-to-file regime, truly simplifies 
assessing the relevant dates for determining patentability as 
against prior art references and other prospective patentees.  
All potentially invalidating events are compared against the 
filing date. 
The change to a first-to-file system proposed in the Patent 
Reform Act of 2005 would not achieve the administrative 
efficiency with respect to ascertaining the inventors’ rights of 
priority presently enjoyed by the European and Japanese 
patent offices.  The proposed legislation retained the one-year 
grace period that permits the inventor to file up to one year 
after publication or commercialization activity.53  Fact 
discovery would still be needed for establishing the dates of 
pre-filing activity by the inventor.  Indeed, first-to-invent 
factual inquiries may well remain a part of U.S. patent law 
under the proposed legislation.  Thus, the detrimental effects 
associated with the upheaval of the current law by the 
proposed legislation are not tempered by any benefit of long-
term improvement in administrative efficiency in assessing 
relevant dates of activity affecting patentability. 
Another difference between the proposed first-to-file 
system for the United States and the first-to-file systems in 
                                                          
 51. Various approaches have been proposed for quantifying or rating the 
value of a patent.  See, e.g., R. Polk Wagner, The Patent Quality Index, 
Presentation at the University of Pennsylvania Law School (January 2006), 
available at 
http://www.law.upenn.edu/blogs/polk/pqi/documents/2006_1_presentation.pdf. 
 52. See Convention on the Grant of European Patents, art. 54(2), Oct. 5, 
1973, 1065 U.N.T.S. 222; Japanese Patent Law, Law No.121 of 1959, § 29(1). 
 53. See Patent Reform Act of 2005, H.R. 2795, 109th Cong. § 3(b) (2005). 
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Japan and Europe is the availability of a provisional patent 
application in the United States.54  It is expected that a 
common procedure that would be used under the proposed first-
to-file system in the United States would be to quickly file an 
initial disclosure (for example, the original invention disclosure 
form from the inventor) as an initial provisional patent 
application, and then follow it with a series of follow-on 
provisional applications as further information about the 
invention (such as engineering drawings, specifications, and 
test results) develops.  A regular utility application would then 
be prepared prior to the one-year anniversary of the original 
provisional application or just prior to the public disclosure of 
the invention. 
While such a string of running provisional applications 
may seem like a reasonable way to deal with a first-to-file 
system, the likely outcome will be not only increased costs for 
preparing and filing multiple applications for the same 
invention, but also increased costs to prosecute the cases, 
especially in situations with two different lines of applications 
by different inventors pursuing a similar invention.  In these 
situations, the USPTO will be forced to evaluate each string of 
priority applications to determine which inventor was first to 
make a filing that supported the claimed invention, a process 
that would be known as an “inventor’s rights contest.”55  As a 
result, the arguments advanced for the administrative 
efficiencies achieved by adopting a first-to-file system in the 
United States are not likely to be realized.  Without these 
administrative efficiencies, the more likely outcome will be an 
overall decrease in patent quality and an increase in patent 
application pendency for a larger percentage of those cases 
which involve two or more parties contesting patent rights 
related to the same or similar subject matter. 
C. INTERFERENCES ARE NOT LESS EFFICIENT THAN INVENTORS’ 
RIGHTS CONTESTS 
Some of the arguments advanced for adopting a first-to-file 
                                                          
 54. See 35 U.S.C. § 111(b) (2000) (“A provisional application for patent 
shall be made or authorized to be made by the inventor, except as otherwise 
provided in this title.”). 
 55. See H.R. 2795 § 3(i). 
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system have targeted the current interference process.56  
Implicit in the Patent Reform Act of 2005 is the assumption 
that the “inventor’s rights contest” process proposed in the bill 
will be simpler and more efficient than the current interference 
process of determining who was the first to invent a claimed 
invention.  These arguments have focused on the decrease in 
patent quality and increase in patent expenses and patent 
application pendency that have historically been associated 
with the long and tortuous process of using the interference 
procedures to resolve disputes over who was the true first 
inventor of an invention.  For many reasons, the proposed 
inventor’s rights contest is more likely to be a step backward, 
rather than forward, in making the process of determining who 
should be awarded a patent more efficient and predictable. 
While historically interferences certainly deserved their 
reputation as an arcane legal quagmire,57 recent changes have 
significantly streamlined the interference process to make the 
process more efficient and certain.58  More importantly, the 
interference process is invoked only in those relatively few 
cases where an issued patent and a pending patent application 
have claims that are overlapping and the party with the later 
filing date has evidence suggesting that they had invented the 
claimed invention before the party with the earlier filing date.  
In reality, interferences are declared for only about 100 of the 
more than 376,000 patent applications filed each year.59  In 
                                                          
 56. See, e.g., Hearing on Committee Print Regarding Patent Quality 
Improvement Before the Subcomm. on Courts, the Internet and Intellectual 
Property, 109th Cong. (April 20, 2005) (statement of Jeffrey P. Kushan on 
behalf of Genentech, Inc.), available at 
http://www.promotetheprogress.com/ptpfiles/patentreform/houseoversight/042
005/prepared/kushan(dna).pdf; COMMITTEE ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
RIGHTS IN THE KNOWLEDGE-BASED ECONOMY, NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, A 
PATENT SYSTEM FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 107, 126 (Stephen A. Merrill et al. 
eds., 2004), available at http://www.nap.edu/html/patentsystem. 
 57. See, e.g., Cooper v. Goldfarb, 154 F.3d 1321, 1326 (Fed. Cir. 1998) 
(referring to extensive interference proceedings lasting over twelve years). 
 58. See Bruce H. Stoner, Jr., Official Gazette Notice, Interference Practice 
– New Procedures for Handling Interference Cases at the Board of Patent 
Appeals and Interferences (Nov. 6, 1998), available at 
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/sol/og/1998/week48/patapp2.htm; see 
also Rules of Practice Before the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences, 
37 C.F.R. §§ 41.200-41.208 (2005). 
 59. See U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, BOARD OF PATENT APPEALS 
AND INTERFERENCES PROCESS PRODUCTION REPORT (2004), available at 
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/dcom/bpai/docs/process/fy2004.htm (reporting 
that eighty-six inter partes cases were declared by the Board of Patent Appeals 
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these rare situations, the parties would have to undertake 
discovery to resolve which inventor had the best-documented 
dates of conception and reduction to practice of the claimed 
invention.  For more than 99.9% of patent applicants, there is 
no need to resort to this kind of procedure to establish whether 
the applicant should be entitled to a patent. 
Under the proposed inventor’s rights contest process, it is 
very likely that an equivalent determination to an interference 
will be necessary for overlapping rights, but this will happen 
more often, not less often, than interferences for two reasons.  
First, the strategy of filing strings of running provisional 
applications is likely to become more popular and therefore the 
potential for “documented” overlap will increase, not decrease.  
Second, the incentives that create the rush to get provisional 
patent applications on file will increase the likelihood that 
there are legitimate disputes over which provisional application 
actually first legitimately enabled a given claimed invention by 
providing a sufficient description of the claimed invention.  
Instead of affording inventors and their attorneys time to 
prepare careful and thoughtful patent applications—as is 
encouraged by the first-to-invent system—the first-to-file 
system encourages and rewards hasty and piecemeal filings for 
the sake of preserving a filing date. 
The proposed first-to-file system will place the burden on 
each and every applicant to create multiple, prompt patent 
application filings in order to be in the best position to defend 
their rights to a claimed invention.  As such, all applicants will 
now bear the increased costs of defending their rights by 
making early filings.  In contrast, the current first-to-invent 
system allows inventors to either file quickly or to rely on 
internal documentation of an invention and development 
process to preserve their rights to a claimed invention.  Only in 
those very few situations where there are actual interferences 
under the current law is it necessary for patent applicants and 
owners to bear the costs of defending their rights to inventions 
for which they believe they were the earlier inventors. 
                                                          
and Interferences in fiscal year 2004); U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, 
PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT FISCAL YEAR 2004, tbl.2 (2004), 
available at 
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/annual/2004/060402_table2.html  
(listing 376,810 patent applications filed in fiscal year 2004). 
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VI. BETTER IDEAS FOR IMPROVING PATENT QUALITY 
Even though the first-to-invent system may seem like a 
quaint anachronism whose time has passed, in reality, under 
the distributed innovation reward system in the United States, 
the first-to-invent standard provides for a more efficient and 
higher quality patent system than a first-to-file system.  By 
giving inventors and attorneys more time to prepare patent 
applications, the quality of the patent applications should be 
better than would be the case under a first-to-file system.  If 
improving patent quality is the true objective, full funding of 
the USPTO, increased filing fees, and deferred examinations 
are much better solutions with proven track records in both 
Europe and Japan.  While the recent proposed USPTO rule 
changes are certain to be the subject of much discussion and 
objection by the patent bar,60 these proposed rule changes are 
good examples of ways in which improvements to efficiency of 
patent prosecution can be achieved without resorting to a first-
to-file system. 
Certainly there is room for improving our first-to-invent 
system to remove disadvantages for international inventors 
and to make the standards clearer on what constitutes prior 
art.  There is also merit in enacting more well-defined 
standards for the obviousness of an invention and even 
adopting the equivalent of claiming standard or style sheets61 
                                                          
 60. See e.g., Changes to Practice for Continuing Applications, Requests for 
Continued Examination Practice, and Applications Containing Patentably 
Indistinct Claims, 71 Fed. Reg. 48 (proposed Jan. 3, 2006) (to be codified at 37 
C.F.R. pt. 1); Changes to Practice for the Examination of Claims in Patent 
Applications, 71 Fed. Reg. 61 (proposed Jan. 3, 2006) (to be codified at 37 
C.F.R. pt. 1).  Both proposed rule changes attempt to impose certain 
limitations on prosecution of patent applications, both in terms of the number 
of claims submitted in a given application and in terms of the number of 
continuing applications that would be permitted for any given family of patent 
applications.  The proposed rule change in 71 Fed. Reg. 48, limiting the 
number of continuing applications to one as a matter of right without 
obtaining permission of the Commissioner, will clearly cut down on the 
number of continuing applications.  The proposed rule change in 71 Fed. Reg. 
61, requiring submission of an onerous examination support document for any 
applications having more than ten independent or dependent claims 
designated for initial examination, will certainly serve as a deterrent to 
applications with large numbers of claims.  Whether either of these proposed 
rule changes will ultimately be adopted is an open question, especially in the 
case of the limitation on the number of continuing applications, which appears 
to be in tension with both existing case law precedent and statutory authority.  
See, e.g., 35 U.S.C §§ 119-120 (2000); In re Henriksen, 399 F.2d 253 (1968). 
 61. The argument that inventors and patent attorneys need an unfettered 
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as other ways to improve the quality of patents issued by the 
USPTO.  The recent report by the Government Accountability 
Office on patent quality and the USPTO provides ample ground 
for making incremental changes to the patent laws and USPTO 
without the need to abandon our first-to-invent patent 
standard.62 
VII. CONCLUSION 
In the spirit of global harmonization, the Patent Reform 
Act of 2005 attempted to settle the debate between the more 
distributed, first-to-invent standard and the more centralized, 
first-to-file standard by choosing the first-to-file standard as 
the “better” regime.  However, in the context of worldwide 
innovation, the optimum theoretical and practical answer to 
the question of which standard is better for global innovation 
reward systems may well be “both.”  Having a single approach 
to rewarding innovation will necessarily channel innovation 
into those models that are best suited for that approach.  
Because innovation is, by definition, a process of creating 
something that is not presently known, it is antithetical to 
presume that we can know with any certainty the single best 
system to encourage innovation. 
Even though there may be some level of increased costs 
associated with using different standards for patentability in 
different countries across the world, both individuals and 
companies with any significant business presence outside the 
United States have learned how to effectively use a worldwide 
patent system with different standards in different countries.  
Because of the higher costs of obtaining protection outside the 
United States and because of the differences in potential 
market size and the adoption of different innovations, 
companies and inventors tend to self-select which innovations 
                                                          
license in deciding how to craft claims defining an invention is simply an 
unsupportable fiction.  The overwhelming majority of inventions today are 
improvements of and refinements to existing technologies made in fields 
where terminology and claim styles can be standardized without any 
significant sacrifice to the ability of inventors and patent attorneys to define 
inventions. 
 62.  GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: KEY 
PROCESSES FOR MANAGING PATENT AUTOMATION STRATEGY NEED 
STRENGTHENING (2005), available at 
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d05336.pdf. 
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should be pursued in which countries based on the particular 
marketing and competitive pressures unique to that company 
or inventor. 
In industries where the bulk of the marketplace is in the 
United States, international patent protection is generally 
relegated to the backseat in terms of any kind of enforcement 
or licensing of patents.  Harmonizing patent standards will 
tend to reduce the beneficial effects of this kind of country-by-
country self-selection process for patent protection and actually 
encourage economic inefficiency by making it easier for patents 
to be mechanically propagated throughout the world without a 
well-defined business objective for each jurisdiction.63  While 
reformers may argue for the benefits of global harmonization of 
patent standards, the reality is that the world is better served 
by having different approaches to rewarding innovation in 
different countries. 
There is good counsel in the old adage “Haste makes 
waste.”  Those considering the first-to-file provisions proposed 
in the Patent Reform Act of 2005 should heed this advice as 
they decide whether to make the most significant change to the 
U.S. patent laws in the history of our country.  The rush to file 
that will result from a first-to-file patent system is a haste that 
will mean more waste for the U.S. inventor and the U.S. 
economy, all for the sake of a supposedly easier patent system 
for multinational corporations in the global economy. 
The U.S. patent system has led the way for the last two 
centuries in encouraging not only innovation, but also 
investment in entrepreneurship and new technologies.  With 
more than two-thirds of the capitalized value of publicly traded 
companies now representing intangible intellectual property 
assets, it is critically important to carefully consider whether 
we should fall in line with Europe and Japan for a first-to-file 
patent system, or whether, perhaps, we should be willing to 
accept the long-term inefficiencies inherent in maintaining 
different systems throughout the world for rewarding 
innovation in favor of maintaining our distributed innovation 
system. 
                                                          
 63. Examples of this economic inefficiency resulting from mechanically 
pursuing patent protection in countries where there is no appreciable 
marketplace for the patented technology include the cost borne by the 
patentee of procuring these needless patents, and the social costs endured by 
countries associated with the patent rights (such as encumbrance on 
development of derivative technologies by third parties). 
